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There  is little basis for the view that the South  could  contribute
to major reductions in  global warming by taking new and
stronger  steps to reduce its population.  But cost analysis sug-
gests that it makes sense for developed  countries  in their own
interests  to spend  money  to reduce  rates  of population  growth  in
developing  countries  as part of any optimal carbon reduction
strategy.
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Birdsall  addresses  two questions:  First, how  The answer  to the second question  is that
much  could feasible reductions  in projected  rates  reducing  population  growth is cost-effective
of population  growth  in the developing  countries  compared  with other  options to reduce emis-
help reduce  greenhouse  gas emissions?  Second,  sions.  Birdsall  estimates  the costs of reducing
how much would  it cost to ensure such reduc-  carbon  emissions  by reducing  births through
tions in population  growth,  compared  with other  increased  spending  on family planning  at be-
options  for reducing  emissions?  tween  $6 and $12 per ton; and by educating  girls
at between  $4 and $8 per ton. These  compare to
The answer  to the first question  is that  a marginal  cost of $20 per ton to reduce  current
reductions  in population  growth  would  matter,  eirmissions  by 10 percent,  using a carbon  tax.
but not much.  Based on current  econometric  Discounting  reduces  the cost advantage  of the
estimates  linking  population  growth  to deforesta-  population  reduction  strategies  over the tax, but
tion, feasible  reductions  in population  growth  does  not eliminate  them as a critical part of an
could  reduce  emissions  from deforestation  overall  global strategy  to reduce  emissions.
(relative  to what they otherwise  would  be) by 8
percent  over the next 35 years.  Feasible  reduc-  The implication  of the cost analysis  is
tions in population  growth  rates could  reduce  simple:  The global  negative  externality  repre-
fossil fuel  emissions  by about 10 percent.  The  sented  by rapid  population  growth  in developing
percentage  reductions,  though  substantial,  are  countries  provides  a strong,  new rationale  for
small  relative to projections  of a tripling  or more  developed  countries,  in their own interests,  to
in emissions  under any baseline scenario  in the  finance  programs  that would reduce  population
next 50 years.  growth  in developing  countries.  This is true  even
though feasible  reductions  in population  growth
Thus there is little basis for the  view that the  would represent  only a modest  contribution  to
South could  contribute  to major reductions  in  reducing  greenhouse  gas emissions.  Spending  to
global warning by taking new and stronger steps  reduce  rates of population  growth  in developing
to reduce  its population.  countries  makes  sense as part of any optimal
carbon  reduction  strategy.
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iIntroduction and Summary
There is considerable popular concern that world population growth is a critical contnbutor
to the emissions of greenhouse gases and thus to the potential for global warming. The accumulated
stock of greenhouse gases now in the atmosphere is almost wholly the responsibility of developed
countries, where increases in emissions  have been associated largely  with industrialization  and income
growth, and not with population growth, which has been low in the last few decades.  However,
annual flows of emissions are increasing more slowly now in the developed countries, whereas in
developing countries annual flows are increasing rapidly and are likely to continue to increase at a
rapid rate, due to the combination of expected per capita income growth with continuing high rates
of population growth.
This paper addresses two questions:  First, how much could feasible reductions in projected
rates of population growth in the developing countries contnbute  to reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions? Second, what would be the cost of ensuring such reductions in population growth, relative
to the cost of other options for reducing emissions?
The answer to the first question is that reductions in population growth would matter - but
could not be key to achieving a levelling off of emissions, let alone a reduction in them.  Feasible
reductions in population growth rates could reduce fossil fuel emissions by about 10 percent by the
year 2050.  Based on econometric estimates linking population growth to  deforestation, feasible
reductions in population growth could reduce emissions from deforestation (relative to what they
otherwise would be) by about 6 percent over the next 35 years.  The percentage reductions, though
substantial, are small relative to projections of a tripling of emissions in the next 50 years under any
baseline scenario.
This conclusion will appear surprising in the light of analyses such as Bongaarts (1992), who
concludes:  'The role of population growth as a determinant of the projected rise in CO 2 emissions
1appears  to be substantial. It accounts  for 35 percent oi the global  increase  and for 48 percent of the
growth  in LDCs between 1985  and 2100." (pp. 11-12) However,  the apparent difference  lies only
in the starting  point. Bongaarts  estimates  the amount  of future emissions  to be accounted  for by all
of projected  future population  growth. The question  in this  paper is not what  difference  elimination
of all future population  growth  would make,  but what difference  feasible  reductions  from current
projections  of population  growth  would  make.'
There is, therefore, only a limited basis for adding  the specter of global  warming  to the
arguments  in favor  of reducing  rapid population  growth  rates in developing  countries 2, and there is
little basis for the view that the south could  contnbute to major reductions  in global  warming  by
taking  new and stronger  steps to reduce its population  growth.
The second  question,  regarding  costs, arises  for the following  reason. The effects  of more
people on global  greenhouse  gas emissions  are probably  the most obvious  example  of a case where
rapid population  growth  in developing  countries  may  represent  a negative  externality  at the global
level,  that is rapid  population  growth  in one country  or set of countries  may  impose  costs on other
countries  beyond  any  costs it imposes  on the countries  where it is occurring. This externality  could
provide  a new and important  rationale  for developed  countries,  in their own interests,  to finance
programs that might reduce population  growth in developing  countries  - independent  of such
traditional  rationales  as improving  the welfare  of the poor in developing  countries,  or improving  the
likelihood  of more rapid economic  growth  in developing  countries  so as to ensure for developed
As explained  below, zero population  growth in developing  countries is not demographically
possible  for at least 50 years,  even  were fertility  to fall immediately  to replacement  level (itself also
a virtual  impossibility).
2 There are in any  event other more  compelling  reasons  for concern  with rapid  population  growth
in developing  countries,  in particular  the likelihood  that high fertility  among  the poor deepens  and
prolongs  the battle against  poverty,  and the possibility  that rapid  population  growth,  particularly  in
poor countries,  exacerbates  local  environmental  problems.
2countries more stable and reliab.e trading partners.  Such financing  makes sense if programs  to
reduce  population  growth  are cost-effective  in terms  of the specific  goal  of reduced  global  emissions,
con,pared  with alternative  approaches  to reducing  such emissions  over the next 50 to 100  years. 3
Estimates  of the costs of reducing  emissions  through lower population  growth  come from
evidence  on the effects  of educating  girls  on their subsequent  fertility,  and on the effects  of family
planning  services  on fertility. These estimates  -- in the range  of $3 to $11  per ton of reduced  carbon
emissions  -- suggest  that the costs are well  worth the benefits. This is so even though the benefits
are relatively  small,  simply  because  the cost of comparable  reductions  in emissions  via, for example,
carbon  taxes,  is higher.
In Section 1, the two  mechanisms  through  which  population  growth  in developing  countries
contributes  to greenhouse  gas emissions,  namely  fossil  fuel emissions  and deforestation,  are set out.
Available  information  is summarized  on the flow of emissions  and on the accumulated  stock of
enmissions,  distinguishing  between  developing  and developed  countries. In  Section  2, the effects  of
feasible  lower rates of population  growth in reducing  fossil fuel emissions  and deforestation  are
estimate? For fossil  fuel emissions,  a reference  or "business-as-usual"  path of emissions  is compared
to a path of emissions  based on lower rates of population  growth in developing  countries,  using
alternative World Bank population projections. An estimate of the effects of the alternative
projections  of reduced population  growth on reduced deforestation  is also presented, based on
estimated  elasticities  from selected  within-ountry studies. In Section 3, estimates  of the cost of
3Whether  such  expenditures  are cost-effective  for reducing  emissions  or not, there would  obviously
continue  to be other rationales  for financing  population  programs.  Insofar  as such  programs  improve
welfare in developing  countries at low cost, local as well as international  financing  is obviously
justified. Birdsall  and Griffin, 1991,  make the point that irrespective  of the motive  for financing
population  programs,  the content of such programs  must be welfare-enhancing  for the poor in
developing  countries,  if the programs  are to be effective  in reducing  fertility.
3reducing  emissions  are presented and compared  tc the likely  costs of reducing  emissions  through
spendh', -n family  planning  and on educating  girls. A concluding  section  summarizes  the finaings.
Section 1. Population  Growth  and Greenhouse  Gas Emissions  in Developing  Countries
There are two principal  mechanisms  by which  population  growth in developing  countries
contributes  to the potential  for global  warming.  The first  is through  the effect  of a larger population
at a given  per capita income  on fossil  fuel emissions,  as a result  of increased  demand  for energy  for
power,  industry,  and transport. I refer here to a simple  arithmetic  effect of more people, holding
constant  per capita  income.  (It is  possible  of course  that population  growth  affects  per capita  income;
recent cross-country  analysis  indicates  that higher population  growth  is associated  with lower  per
capita income growth in the  1980-85  period, with a greater negative relation for low-income
countries. 4 But for simplicity  and given that the effect of higher per capita income  on per capita
emissions  itself varies by income level, as will be seen below, this complication  is ignored in the
computations  below.')
The second  mechanism  by  which  rapid population  growth  may  contnbute to greenhouse  gas
emissions  is through  whatever  effect  such growth  has on deforestation  with its associated  emissions
of carbon.  The empirical evidence on how population growth in developing  countries affects
deforestation,  either independently  or by interacting  with and exacerbating  the effects  of poverty,
poor land  security,  and poor government  policies,  is available  only  for a few  settings  over a few  time
I Brander  and Dowrick  (1991);  Bloom  and Freeman  (1987). The negative  relation  is not found in
earlier (postwar) periods,  probably  because per capita income growth was associated  with rapid
mortality  decline  as well  as rapid fertility  decline. With overall  mortality  levels  relatively  low  now  in
most countries,  the negative  relationship  between income  growth  and population  growth  may  now
more closely  reflect a negative  relationship  of income  growth  to fertility.
I Despite the evidence  for a simple  bivariate  negative  association,  the literature  on the effects  of
rapid population  growth  on economic  growth  and development  remains  controversial.  For extensive
reviews,  see Birdsall  1988;  Birdsall,  1989;  Kelley,  1988;  Simon,  1989;  National  Research  Council,  1987.
4periods,  and can only be aggregated  at the level  of developing  countries  as a group using  strong  and
rather crude assumptions.' The attempt set out below  should  be regarded  as a first effort, done
primarily  to provide  some  basis  for comparing  the potential  benefits  of reduced population  growth
via reduction  of fossil  fuel emission  vs. reductions  in the rate of deforestation.
Table 1 shows  shares of population,  GDP and estimated  shares in annual flows  of carbon
emissions  for various  groups of countries  in 1988.' The current share of developing  countries  in
annual  flows  of fossil-fuel  based  carbon  emissions  is about 20 percent,' and in carbon  emissions  due
to deforestation  is about 95 percent. Fossil  fuel burning  to meet increased  energy  demand  accounts
for almost 80 percent of carbon emissions9;  because deforestation  contrioutes  much less to total
emissions  than fossil fuel emissions,  the combined  total share of developing  countries  in annual
emission  flows  is low  despite  the deforestation  phenomenon,  about 33 percent. With only  about 15
percent of total world  population,  the developed  countries  (excluding  the Soviet  Union  and E'Astern
'For  a recent review  of the effects  of population  pressure  on deforestation,  including  case  studies
in four developing  countries,  see Cruz, 1991.
' Most available  data and projections  of emissions  deal with carbon  only,  and so the discussion  in
Section  2 is based  on carbon  emissions  only. Carbon  emissions  comprise  about 50 percent  of current
emissions  of all greenhouse  gases,  and this percent is likely  to increase  as emissions  of CFCs are
controlled. Ogawa,  1991,  cites EPA data in stating  that CO 2 is estimated  to have  been responsible
for 66 percent  df the incremental  greenhouse  effect between 1880  and 1980,  and 49 percent during
the 1980s.
I This is also the figure used by Ogawa  (1991,  Table 1).  He estimated  it on the basis  of energy
consumption  data published  by the International  Energy  Agency  and British  Petroleum  Company.
' This number is based on total emissions  of 5.9 billion tons from fossil fuels (Table 2) plus
emissions  of 1.6  billion  tons from deforestation.  The latter figure  is based  on unpublished  estimates
developed  by Robert Schneider of the World Bank.  He revised 1987 estimates  of Houghton,
published  in Worldwatch  Institute  State of the World,  using  more  recent 1989  estimates  of Houghton
on deforestation  and adjusting  Houghton's  1989  estimate  to take into account 1990  data showing
reduced  deforestation  rates in Brazil  (a major  contributor  among  all developing  countries  to emission
from deforestation). See World Bank, 1991  (by Schneider)  regarding  the latest Brazil  data.
5Europe) account  for more than 55 perent  of annualtflowt  of total carbon emissions,' 0 with the
remaining  12 percent accounted  for by Eastern Europe and the Soviet  Union. However,  the share
of developed  countries  in annual flows  has declined  since 1969,  while the shares of the two other
grcups have increased  (not shown)." 1
Table 2 shows  annual flows  of fossil-fuel  based  carbon emissions  for selected countries  in
absolute  and per capita amounts  (1960  and 1988),  and in amounts  per dollar of GNP (1987). The
country  data show  that the large overall  share of the developed  countries  shown  in Table 1 is due
to higher  GNP and higher  per capita  emissions.  The reasons  for the declining  share of developed
countries  are apparent. First, per capita emissions  are rising  faster in developing  countries,  which  is
not surprising  since the base is much lower. Second,  population  growth  has been more rapid in
developing  countries (about 2 percent over the period compared with less than 1 percent in
developed countries);  even if per capita emissions  had not changed in either grcup, absolute
emissions  would  be rising  faster in developing  countries.
Third,  as shown  in Table  2 (last  column),  the "emissions-intensity"  of GNP in the developed
countries  is lower than in developing  countries. Emissions  intensities  have also been declining  in
developed  countries. In 1987,  fossil  fuel carbon  emissions  were over 2,000  grams  per dollar of GNP
in China' 2, 655 in India and 609 in Mexico,  compared  with 276 grams  in the U.S.,  223 in (West)
'°  The computation  is as follows:  (.52),  the share  of developed  countries  in total flows  of 5.9 billion
tons due to fossil  fuel emissions  (see Table  2) plus (.05), the share of developed  countries  in total
flows  of 1.6  billion  tons due to deforestation  equals .553,  the total share of developed  countries  in
annual flows  of total global  carbon  emissions.
"The  share of fossil fuel emissions  of the United States, greater Germany,  United Kingdom,
France,  Japan, and Italy  fel from 54 percent  l 1960  to 39 percent in 1988  (Boden  et al., 1990).
'2 Income per capita in  China would be much higher (perhaps three times) compared to
industrialized  countries,  and higher  also  compared  to other developing  countries,  if estimated  on the
basis  of purchasing  power parity  rather than using  conventional  exchange  rates (which  fail to take
into account the lower costs of services  and other nontradables  in low-income  countries). The
appropriate  correction  would  make  China  look much  less  profligate  in emissions  per dollar  of GNP -
6Germany  and 156  in Japan. High emissions  per dol:ar  of GNP in developing  countries  is the result
of a combination  of factors. Developing  countries  are at an earlier stage of development,  in which
the shift from agriculture  to industry  implies  increasing  use of energy  per unit of value added; in
comparison  the shift in developed  countries  from mdustry  to services  may  imply  decreasing  use of
energy. Within  the envelope  of enerov  used,  developing  countries  have  shifted  less  away  from coal
to cleaner but higher-cost  fuels,  because they are less able to incur the higher costs and are less
concerned  with local  air pollution. Within  the envelope  of fuels used,  developing  countries  are less
likely  to use new  clean  technologies  to reduce  emissions,  given  lower  levels  of resources  and of new
investments.  Finally,  developing  countries  are not as "efficient"  in their use of energy  as developed
countries,  i.e. they are more likely  to be using  more  energy  than is optimal  from an allocative  point
of view,  due to underpricing  of energy  itself and of capital  in general,  lack of competition  among
major users of energy  due to trade barriers  and the monopolistic  protection  that state enterprises
enjoy,  insufficient  incentives  at the firm  level  to invest  in cleaner  technologies  and so on.'
What matters for potential  global  warming  is the accumulated  stock,  not the annual flows,
since  greenhouse  gases  are retained  in the atmosphere  for long  periods  and current  annual  emissions
contribute relatively  little to that stocLk" Over the last 30 years, the total contribution  of the
developing  countries to fossil fuel carbon emissions  is certainly  lower than the 1988  estimated
- particularly  compared  to India  with  its warmer  climate  - though  still  at double  the levels  in the U.S.
13  For a useful discussion  of differences  in fuel use and of the distortions  tbh't may lead to
inefficiency  in energy  use in developing  countries,  ;ncluding  underpricing,  lack  of competition  because
of trade barriers  and because  many  producers  a`  users of energy  are state enterprises,  see Bates,
1991.
14 Eckaus,  1991,  points this out and notes that when stock matters and accumulates  slowly,  the
conventional  procedure  of computing  present  discounted  values  to assess  the significance  of a future
event makes  little sense.
7contribution  of 20 percent,  since  emissions  have  been growing  in absolute  terms  faster in developing
than developed  countries.
The implications  are clear. Though  the developing  countries  contribute  and have  contributed
relatively  little to emissions,  especially  given  their larger  share in world  population,  they  are also  the
likely  source  of a substantial  par 4 c  future growth  in fossil  fuel emissions,  for the same reasons  that
have  caused  their share in total emissions  to rise in the last several  decades. Thair per capita fossil
fuel emissions  are still  low  but are likely  to rise  with increasing  income. Their emissions  per dollar
of GNP are relatively  high;  for various  reasons  noted above  they are still  on the steep portion  of the
curve that describes  the relation  between per capita income  and emissions. (Lower emissions  per
dollar of GNP for developed  countries  suggests  this  curve rises  at a declining  rate, and may  even fail
above some level of income.) Fnally, they have had and will continue to have higher rates of
population  growth.
Table  3 shows  estimates  of annual  deforestation  for the major  countries  in terms  of absolute
amounts of deforestation,  and associated  estimates  of carbon emissions  from two sources. (The
differences  in the two  sources  provide  an indication  of the rtate of understanding  and of data.) As
with  fossil  fuel emissions,  it seems  likely  that emissions  due to deforestation  will  increase  for the next
several  decades in developing  countries. However,  the absolute contnbution  of deforestation  to
greenhouse gas emissions  cannot increase indefinitely,  simply  because the forest base is being
reduced,  and thus the share of global  emissions  due to deforestation  is likely  to decline  in the long
run.
8Section  2.  Effects  of Slower  Population  Growth  on Fossil  Fuel Emissions  and on Deforestation
Fossil .'uel Emissions
To examine  the effects  of " asible reductions  in population  growth rates on reductions  in
fossil  fuel emissions,  I use alternative  population  projections  of the World  Bank. These are referred
to below  as the "standard"  projections  and the "rapid"  projections,  where the latter builds  in more
rapid fertility  decline.'
Table 4 shows  for all developing  countries  (including  China,  excluding  Eastern Europe and
the Sovi- Union)  the differences  in population  growth  rates and in total fertility  rates  that underlie
projected population growth under the two scenarios, and the  resulting projections of  total
population. In the standard scenario  (which  is similar  to the "medium"  projections  of the Uniled
Nations),  the total fertility  rate declines  fiom 3.62 for the period 1995-2000  to 2.4 for the period
20252050.16  Fertility  declines  to replacement  level (a total fertility  rate slightly  above  two) in most
developing  countries  in the first  decade  or two  of the next  century;  the transition  to replacement  level
fertility  is virtually  complete  in all developing  countries  by the year  2050.
In the rapid fertility  decline  (hereafter rapid)  scenario,  fertility  decline  begins  in 1990  in all
countries," 7 and declines  more rapidly  -- at a rate roughly  equivalent  to 90 percent of the rate of
I The basis for these projections  is explained  in detail in Bos and Bulatao (1990)  and in Bos
(1991). The numbers  used in this paper are based  on preliminary  projections  (as of September,
1991). These may  change  slightly  before they are published  in 1992.
16 The assumption  is that in all countries  where fertility  is already  declining  it will  continue  to do
so at the average  rate experienced  in the past for all developing  countries  (0.6  reduction  in the total
fertility  rate every 5 years). In countries  where fertility  decline  has not occurred,  but where life
expectancy  exceeds  50, fertility  decline  is  also assumed  to start in 1990,  initially  at a somewhat  slower
pace than in the frst set of countries. In countries  where,  life expectancy  is below  50, fertility  does
not decline  until that point in the future when life expectancy  is projected  to reach 50; then decline
follows  the standard  patterm
17  Fertflity  decline begins in 1990  in the "rapid"  scenario even in countries where current life
expectancy  is below  50 years.
9decline in a set of countries where fertility decline has been rapid in certain periods between 1950
and the present.  (For example,  declines in the total fertility  rate of almost 0.2 per year have occurred
over 10-year  periods in Colombia, Singapore, Korea and Thailand.) In other words, the assumption
is built in that all developing counLries  can achieve a rate of decline in fertility almost as rapid as that
already achieved by a select group in the past.
In the standard scenario, the population of all developing countries is projected to grow from
about 4 billion today (3.67 billion in 1985,  the baseline year for the projections) to 10.6 billion in the
year 2100, and to stabilize by the year 2150 at  11 billion.  The increase of more than 6 billion
between now and the year 2100 occurs despite the assumption built into these standard projections
that fertility will  continue to decline in all developing countries (in the case of those countries, largely
in Africa, where no decline is yet discernible, the assumption is that  fertility will begin to decline
before the year 2000).  Under the scenario of rapid fertility decline, the population of developing
countries would still increase by almost 5 billion, going from 3.67 billion today to about 84  billion in
the year 2100, and would stabilize at a projected 8.67 billion by the year 2150.
Even with rapid fertility decline, the increase alone in population size in developing countries
over the next 100 years is expected to be substantial, exceeding  in absolute terms current population
size.  In  fact, the increases in population under  both projection scenarios dwarf the differences
between them; by the year 2100, the difference in projected total population size for developing
countries between the two projections would be about 2.2 billion -- in absolute terms a large number,
but a relatively small number compared to the 5 billion increase projected even with rapid fertility
decline.
In Table 5, the percentage differences between the two projections are shown for selected
countries and regions,8 and the regions' corresponding shares of total population reductions. More
8 See the appendix table for the underlying population numbers by year and region.
10than one-half of the total difference in the years 2050 and 2100 is accounted for by the projected
difference in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Almost all of the remaining difference is accounted for by the
countries of North Africa and the Middle East.  The difference between the two projections in the
total population of China in 2150 is only 29 million  -- about 1 percent of the total difference of more
than 2 billion.  The rea.'  n is clear:  fertility rates in China are already relatively low, and the
difference that more rapid fertility decline would make is small.
What difference would these alternative projections make to future flows  of carbon emissions
from fossil fuels in developing countries?  To address this question requires first that a baseline, or
reference path of emissions for developing countries be set out.  Table 6 shows emissions from three
different baseline or business-as-usual  paths (labelled "SPP"  in the table, i.e. under the World Bank's
standard pop,ulation  projection): those of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 1991);
of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 1990) and a third prepared by this author. 1'
The first two reference paths are based on projections of energy consumption in each of the regions,
based on projected future population and income, and. taking into account global energy supply.
These two reference paths build in substantial improvements  in energy efficiency. The third path is
based on a simpler projection of emissions in developing countries, based solely on the assumption
'9 Projected emissions are simulated using the assumption that per capita income will increase at
an annual rate of 2 percent per year in ali developing countries over the period 1990 to 2100, and
using the results of a regression of per capita emissions on per capita income, i.e.
LnPCE = constant + InPCY + InPCY2
-12.11 +  1.89 -. 05
(-33)  (18.8)  (-7.7)
where lnPCE is the natural logarithm (In) of per capita emissions and InPCY and InPCY2 refer to
In of per capita income and of per capita income squared.  The regression was run on data for the
period 1960 through 1987 for a sample of 150 developing and developed countries, with the results
shown (t- statistics in parentheses). (I am grateful to Nemat Shafik, who constructed this data set, for
making it available, and to Sushenjit Bandyopadhyay  and Anita Schwartz for programming.)
11that per capita emissions  in developing  countries  will grow  as a function  of increases  in per capita
income;  per capita income  is assumed  to grow  at 2 percent per year.10
Under the baseline  scenarios,  total emissions  from  fossil  fuels  are projected  to nearly  double
by the year 2000, and to increase between seven-fold  (EPA) and more than 20-fold (author's
simulation)  by the year 2050. The difference  in the baseline  scenarios  illustrates  the possible  range
of effects  of technological  change;  none of the baseline  scenarios  allows  for any  policy  change  at alL
Table 6 also shows,  for each region,  the lower  emissions  in future years  associated  with the
lower  population  growth under the rapid fertility  decline  population  projection. (These  reduced
emissions  are shown  in the columns  labelled  "RFD"  in the table.)
The results  can be summarized  simply  (Table  7). In the year  2050,  the diffe  nce in projected
total emissions  of developing  countries  between the two population  projections  is 780 million  tons
(EPA baseline)  and 5 billion  (econometrically  based)  metric  tons. On the one hand,  these numbers
are large  - 780  million  tons is two-thirds  of the total estimated  emissions  of all developing  countries
today, and 5 billion tons is close to today's  world total emissions. On the other hand, for both
scenarios  these differences  amount  to just 9 percent of the total emissions  of developing  countries
21  As noted above,  this  computation  does  not take into account  the possibility  that lower  population
growth  would  induce  greater per capita income  growth  - except to the extent that a steady rate of
annual  per capita income  growth  as h,gh  as 2 percent  is itself unlikely  without  the projected  declines
in population  growth.
12projected  in 2050.'  Even  with lower  population  growth,  emissions  would  have increased  almost  six-
fold in developing  countries  using  the EPA baseline.2
In short, policies  to reduce  population  growth  in developing  countries  and thus  reduce  world
population  size would  contnbute relatively  little to reductions  in fossil  fuel emissions.  There are at
least three reasons.
First, differences  in projections  of population  growth  on a global  scale are not that great.
Demographic  momentum assures that  the  population of  the  developing  countries will grow
dramatically  even  with "rapid  fertility  decline",  because  of the momentum  created  by  the high  fertility
and declining  mortality  of the past three decades. Past high fertility  and falling  mortality  mean
women  entering  childbearing  age now  constitute  a large proportion  of the total population  in these
countries. Because  in most developing  countries,  the next  generation  of women  will  outnumber  the
previous  one, even if the number  of births  per woman  declines  rapidly,  the birth rate can stay high
and the total number  of births  can continue  to rise. (Only  dramatic  increases  in mortality  as a result
of war  or worldwide  natural catastrophe  would  alter this conclusion.  Obviously  concem  with  global
environmental  damage arises because of a global interest in avoiding  catastrophic  increases in
2 Note, moreover  that in the third scenario,  the same regression  coefficients  are applied to all
countries  - so differences  in shares  arise  only  due to differences  in projected  per capita  income  and
in population. If anything,  this exaggerates  the effects of population  change,  since it leads to an
understatement  of China's  predicted  emissions  and an overstatement  of Africa's. Adjustments  were
made to the constant to bring  the "projection"  for 1989  into line with available  data on emissions
across  regions. These are available  from the author.
n It is worth noting that given  there may  be important  nonlinearities  (referred to often as clifHs  in
the environment  literature),  a 9 percent reduction  could  be important. It could be the margin  that
makes  a critical  difference  in whether the polar ice caps  disintegrate,  Bangladesh  is submerged,  etc.
13mortality or other major reductions in human welfare, so an increase in mortality could hardly be
viewed as a solution to the fundamental problem.)
For  example, because  of demographic momentum, the  populations of  most developing
countries  would  almost  double  in  size  before  stabilizing, even  were  fertility rates  to  cdrop
instantaneously to replacement level (about two children per woman).  In contrast, the population
of most developed countries under  this situation would increase by 10 percent  (Germany and
Sweden) to at most 40 percent (the United States).
Is this result due to the huge projected total emissions in the baseline scenarios?  No.  Let
us assume that by the year 2100 developing countries as a group had emissions per capita similar to
the current world average of 1.2 metric tons - ie. well above their current average of about .4, but
still below per capita emissions in most industrialized countries and below that projected using the
approach above; and that the developed countries had reduced their emissions to 1.2 metric tons per
capita. Then total annual global emissions from fossil  fuels under the rapid fertility decline scenario
would be 12.0  billion rather than 14.4  billion tons - compared to a figure of 5.9 billion tons in 1988  -
- still a doubling of total emissions.
Second, the potential for affecting future population size is greatest in those countries of the
developing world where per capita emissions are currently lowest.  As noted above (Table 5), the
greatest potential reductions in population size between the two scenarios are in Africa and the
Middle East.  In contrast, the potential percentage declines for China are smalL Yet Affica has low
emissions per capita while China, with about 29 percent of the developing world's population, had
emissions in 1988 that accounted for 42 percent of the emissions for all developing countries - due
in part to China's heavy use of its abundant coal (Table 2).  Using the EPA estimates in Table 6 for
I  The AIDS epidemic could take a major toil in mortality in Africa and Asia during the next
century (see Armstrong, 1991). Since  Africa has low per capita carbon emissions,  the effect on global
emissions would be minimal.
14the year 2050,  we can calculate  that Africa  and the Middle  East together  would  account  for about
66 percent of the reduction  in emissions  with lower  population  growth  (Table 7).2 Yet this large
share in absolute terms is small -- about 5 percent of expected  total emissions  under the standard
scenario  in 2050.
Third, it is likely that for given per capita income (which we are assuming),  a smaller
population  will  produce  somewhat  higher  per capita  emissions,  due to substitution  of energy  for labor
in production.  To the extent  this is  the case,  the difference  in total emissions  with  more rapid  fertility
decline  would be overstated.  In addition,  if lower population  growth  in fact causes higher per
capita income growth (contrary  to the simplifying  assumption  made in the projections  of carbon
emissions),  the effect  of fewer  people in reducing  emissions  could  be offset  - on the assumption  that
greater income raises  emissions,  at least at the lower level  of income  in regions  where population
growth  might  be cut.
Deforestation
Deforestation  currently  accounts  for estimated  carbon  emissions  on the order of 1.4 billion
tons per year,  compared  to 5.6  billion  tons attributable  to fossil  fuel burning  (Table  2). Thus tropical
'A  The question arises: Why not, as part of a global  carbon  emissions  reduction  strategy,  try to
reduce population  growth  in the industrialized  countries,  where per capita emissions  are 10 to 20
times as high as in Africa?  Ideally,  the feasibility  and costs of such population reductions in
developed  countries  would  also be considered. Though  feasible  reductions  in projected  population
growth  would  be much lower,  since fertility  rates are already  close to replacement  or, in parts of
Europe, even below  replacement,  the cost per birth averted could be 10 to 20 times as high and
would  still compare  favorably  to costs in developing  countries  - at least for as long as the current
ratio of emissions  per capita in the industrialized  countries  relative  to Africa  prevails. Moreover,
women in industrialized  countries  still report that many  births are "unwanted"  - and presumably
would  be averted  were the full costs  of contraception  (and abortion)  lower  than they  currently  are.
'  I am grateful  to Charles  Blitzer  for pointing  this out to me.
15forests are currently contributing  about 20 percent of  the  buildup of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere,  which  in turn accounts  for about 50 percent of the total buildup  from all gases.'
Major  underlying  causes  of deforestation  in developing  countries  include  clearing  of forests
for agriculture  and use of forests  as a source  of woodfuel;  both are closely  associated  with population
growth. Most analysts  agree that logging  for forest products also contributes,  as do government
programs  and  policies  such  as road-building,  fiscal  incentives  to exploit  frontier  areas,  and  colonization
and resettlement  schemes  (in Indonesia  and Brazil  - see, for example,  Schneider 1991,  on Brazil).
Population growth could affect deforestation  by increasing  the demand for agricultural
products and thus the return to  land clearing, and by increasing  the demand for woodfuels,
particularly  in small  urban areas. Cross-section  analysis  of Southgate  (1989,  for cantons  of Ecuador)
links  deforestation  to the size of agricultural  populations;  analysis  across  countries  of Latin  America
(Southgate  et al., 1991)  links agricultural  land growth to rates of population  growth. Allen and
Barnes (1985)  find,  for a cross-section  of developing  countries,  that population  growth  rates in the
1970s  are associated  with  higher  rates  of deforestation;  the relationship  is  stronger  for Africa  and Asia
than for Latin  America,  presumably  because  land  clearing  to extend  agriculture  and use of woodfuel
are both more likely  at lower  average  levels  of income.'  They also  find that across  countries  total
wood  use (the sum  of wood use and wood exports)  is associated  with higher  rates of deforestation.
Rudel (1989),  using  a similar  approach,  reports similar  findings. 2'
26 Deforestation  probably  accounts  for a higher proportion  of the buildup  of methane and other
greenhouse  gases,  and thus accounts  for between  15  and 20 percent of all greenhouse  gas emissions.
(Myers,  1989).
17  They  regress  rates  of deforestation  on rates of population  growth,  controling  for GNP per capita
and extent of forest cover.
'o  Rudel regresses  the natural  logarithm  (In) of changes  in forest coverage  (1976-80)  on the In of
the change  in population  growth, 1960-75,  with controls  for GNP per capita and forest area at the
beginning  of the period. Bilsborrow  (1992)  and Bilsborrow  and Geores (1992)  review  Rudel and
other studies.
16None of these analyses demonstrates an inevitable relationship between population growth
and deforestation.  An estimated 90 percent of increases in agricultural production in the last two
decades is the result of higher yields on existing lands, not the extension of agriculture to new lands
(World Bank, 1992);  and consumption of woodfuels  (and thus deforestation for that purpose) declines
consistently and universally  with household income and city size (Barnes and Qian, 1991), implying
that continued income growth and urban growth will reduce this source of pressure on forests.  (A
rough estimate of the income elasticity of woodfuel consumption is zero, based on the range of
estimates reported by Hyde and Newman, 1991).
However, it is reasonable to assume that barring dramatic policy changes (e.g. in fuel or
agricultural taxes and subsidies), the current association of population growth with deforestation will
persist, particularly in the poorer countries of Africa and Asia. Such an assumption  is consistent with
the observation that worldwide rates of deforestation have continued to increase in the last decade
(a possible exception is Brazil, where rates of forest loss have declined since a peak in 1987)  despite
income growth (outside of Africa) and growth in city size. It is also consistent with the observation
that deforestation in developing countries is closely associated with poverty -- be  it of the small
farmer who migrates to new lands and clears forests, or of the poor urbanite who uses woodfuel --
and that even with modest income growth in developing countries, the problem of poverty will not
be quickly resolved.'  Given this assumption, to what extent would differences in future population
growth alter rates of deforestation and thus rates of emissions of greenhouse gases?
The econometric analyses referred to above suggest roughly that  a one percentage point
difference in  the rate  of population  growth would reduce  annual rates  of deforestation  in  all
developing countries by between one-third and one-half percentage point, and by somewhat more
than that in Africa and Asia (e.g. Allen and Barnes, 1985). (Annual rates of deforestation reported
29  Myers, 1989, makes a similar point.
17by Myers, 1989,  range widely. In West Africa they are high, e.g. 14 percent in Nigeria and 15 percent
in Cote d'Ivoire; in Zaire, with the great bulk of Africa's existing forests, the rate is 0.4 percent. In
Brazil and Indonesia, which along with Zaire account for almost 50 percent of all global forest cover,
Myers' estimated rates in the late 1980s  were 2.3 and 1.4 percent respectively.)  For simplicity,  let
us assume a 0.5 response elasticity  of the rate of deforestation to reductions in the rate of population
growth, implying for example that  a 50 percent reduction in the rate of population growth would
reduce the rate of deforestation by 25 percent. The critical period for analyzing  the effect is between
now and about the year 2025. Beyond the year 2025, the payoff of lower population growth in terms
of reduced emissions  of greenhouse gases from deforestation declines quickly,  both because the forest
base  is lower and  because  the  difference in  the  two  population  projections between  rates  of
population growth drops so rapidly.  The  difference in the population growth rate  between the
standard and rapid fertility  decline projections for this critical period between now and 2025 is almost
60 percent for Africa, and is about 8 percent for Brazil and Indonesia. At 0.5 elasticity, this implies
that with rapid fertility decline over the next 25-35  years, rates of deforestation for Africa as a whole
would decline from roughly 2 percent (one-half of all Africa's forest cover is in Zaire, where the rate
of deforestation is relatively low compared to West Africa), to about 1.4 percent over the period;
rates in Brazil from 2.3 to 2.2 percent; and rates in Indonesia from 1.4 to  1.34 percent.  These
declines would reduce forest loss by perhaps 410,000  square kilometers over the entire period (an
average of 12,000  square kilometers per year -- compared to annual current estimated losses reported
by Myers, 1989, of 140,000  square kilometers).
The bulk of the reduction occurs in Africa, because that is where the great difference occurs
in population growth between the two projections.  The total (global) reduction in deforestation is
relatively  low because Africa accounts for a relatively  small proportion of existing  global forest cover.
18At  10,000 tons  of carbon released per  square  kilometer," the  total reduction  in carbon
releases over the 35-year  period associated with the lower rate of population grow'h would be about
4.1 billion tons, and the average annual reduction about 117  million  tons, compared to current annual
carbon releases associated with deforestation of 1.4 billion tons.  This implies about an 8 percent
reduction  in  carbon emissions due  to deforestation  and  a 2  percent  reduction  'n  total  carbon
emissions.
Section 3. Economic Costs of Reducing CO, Emissions
In this section I compare the economic costs of reducing CO 2 emissions ir  two ways: with
population growth as given, but energy consumption reduced or made more efficient or less carbon
intensive, e.g. through technological  change (the "tax"  route); and with per capita emissions as given,
but  a  reduction  in  total  emissions via  lower increases  in  population  (labelled  hereafter  the
"population"  route).  The cost of attaining lower population growth is discussed in terms of the costs
of educating women (given the evidence that educated women have fewer births) and the costs of
family planning programs, i.e. greater provision of modem contraceptives (given the evidence that
family planning programs reduce fertility over and above the effects of household income, parents'
education and so on. 31)
Ideally, the comparison of the costs of reducing emissions  via the two routes above would be
made in terms of economic costs, i.e. the actual resource costs to the economy  of reducing emissions
under the two alternative approaches.  In fact the cost of the population reduction strategies is
I This is also a crude estimate, based on the observation that Myers  estimates carbon releases from
deforestation in 1989 to be 1.4 billion tons, and reports an estimated 142,000  square kilometers of
(tropical) forest loss, i.e. about 10,000  tons of carbon per square kilometer of deforestation.
31For reviews of the evidence on the determinants of fertility, see Birdsall, 1988 and World Bank,
1984.
19measured in terms of direct costs to government or donors, and does not  take into account any
efficiency  costs due to the associated additional taxation,  while the cost of the carbon tax is measured
in terms  of  foregone  efficiency.  Nor  does  the  comparison does  not  .a%ke  into  account  such
externalities (generally positive, but negative externalities are also possible) as the possible benefits
a  tax might bring via reduced  emissions of other  pollutants  besides greenhouse gases3, or  via
incentive effects on development of new cleaner technologies,  nor the economic productivity  effects
of greater education for women or the health benefits of family  planning. Finally,  the costs discussed
below do not take into account any benefits of reduced global warming.
The effect of discounting on the relative costs of the tax vs. population strategies is explored
briefly below, after presentation of the initial cost estimates. To take fully into account the streams
of costs and benefits of the various carbon reduction strategies would require more detiiled analysis
than is presented here.
Carbon taxes.  Various approaches have been used to estimate the costs of reducing C02
emissions. Nordhaus (1991) reports on estimates from econometric (or elasticity) studies and from
mathematical  programming or  optimizing models.  The  costs  in  these  estimates  assume  an
economically  efficient reduction strategy.'  In econometric anal  he impact of various policies,
such as carbon taxes on consumption or production, is estimated, in the context of behaviorally  based
models of the supply and demand for energy. The underlying models use various assumptions about
32 Shah  and  Larsen  (1992) assess the  case for carbon  taxes in  terms of  the  potential  local
environmental benefits and revenue benefits, noting that currently fossil fuel prices are subsidized
globa"ly  - in an amount in excess of $230 billion (evaluated at end-user prices), equivalent to  a
negative global carbon tax of $40 per  ton of carbon.  They conclude that  Indonesia, India and
Indonesia could benefit  from a carbon tax based solely on  the health benefits to  reducing local
pollution.
3  Le.  assuming competitive markets.  These  estimates also  do  not  take  into  account  any
externalities (such as welfare empowerment due to slower global warming).
20interfuel  substitution,  technological  change,  and the elasticity  of energy  supply. Optimizing  models
are conceptually  similar.3
Nordhaus uses the cost estimates  from about 10 such studies as the basis for fitting an
equation  that thus constitutes  a kind of summary  "cost-reduction  schedule"  of the marginal  co ;t of
reducing  emissions.  As a function  of the percentage  reduction  from a baseline  path, the relationship
of emissions  reductions  to marginal  costs  summarized  in this  schedule  is identical  to the relationship
between a uniform  carbon  tax and the CO 2 reduction;  in other words,  the necessary  tax to reduce
emissions  at each margin  provides  a summary  measure  of the marginal  cost. The estimates  used to
fit his equation generally  allow  factors  of production  to adjust  fully,  and therefore are estimates  of
long-run marginal costs -- short-run costs would be much higher.
The cost reduction schedule  (and in effect the underlying  estimates  that it summarizes)
indicates  that the marginal  cost of a 10 percent reduction  in carbon  emissions  would  be about $20
a ton.'  The average  cost of a 10  percent reduction  from a baseline  path would  be about $10  a ton;
with current global  emissions  of about 6 billion  tons, a 10 percent reduction  would  cost about $6
billion  annually. This cost is relatively  low  -- under one-tenth of 1 percent of annual  world output.
Howe  'er, the schedule  also shows  that costs  of further  reductions  rise rapidly. A 20 percent
reduction  would  require a tax of over $50 a ton and a 50 percent reduction  a tax of $130  a ton.
Nordhaus  elsewhere  (1990)  concludes  that given  current understanding  of the likely  costs  of climate
change,  a tax that reduced  current emissions  by 10  percent would  be reasonable. (He estimates  that
34  To estimate marginal  costs of CO2 reduction,  alternative  constraints  of total emissions  are
imposed,  and efficiency  pricing  and energy  production  under different  constraints  is derived. The
shadow  prices  associated  with the alternative  constraints  are equivalent  to the tax rates that would
induce  the constraints;  thus the marginal  costs of reducing  emissions  by particular  amounts  can be
summarized  in p
5 Wheeler, 1985.
21a lower  tax,  of about $5,  would  be sufficient  to reduce  totatemissions  of all  greenhouse  gases  by 10%,
because  initial  CFC emissions  reductions  are relatively  cheap.)
Averting  a birth through  greater public  spending  on family  planning. How do these costs  of
reducing  emissions  from  a baseline  path  in which  population  increases  are given  compare  to the costs
of reducing  emissions  by reducing  population  increases,  with per capita emissions  given?
Increasing  the availability  of modem  contraceptives  is one approach  to reducing  the rate of
increase in population  growth.  Estimates  of the costs of averting  births through contraceptive
services  or family  planning  programs  require  estimates  of the costs  of delivering  services  to users  and
of the effects  of such  services  in reducing  fertility  -- from  what it might  otherwise  have been even in
the absence  of contraceptive  services.'
The most careful  single  estimate  of the cost of averting  a birth I could find is provided  in a
recent paper of Cochrane and Sai (1991).  They first calculate the costs of a couple year of
protection,  on the basis  of information  at the country  level  on users  and methods. These costs  vary
from about $3 for female sterilization  in Indonesia to about $25 for pill use in Morocco and
Honduras. To translate  costs  per couple  year  of protection  into costs of a birth averted  they  assume
that the foregone  fertility  of users  is  equal to the actual fertility  of all women  of the same  age in the
particular  country. In a mechanical  sense this underestimates  births averted  since the comparator
group includes  contraceptive  users  I  However,  in a behavioral  sense,  it may  overstate  births  averted
due to contraception,  since many  users might have found other ways to control their fertility.3
3' Note that fertility  can and historically  has been controlled in many societies  by abstinence,
withdrawal,  the rhythm  method,  lactation,  separation  of spouses,  and probably  most  important,  by low
rates of marriage  and late age of marriage.
3 Cochrane  and Zachariah  (1983)  provided  two  estimates,  including  a lower  one for costs  of births
averted,  by reducing  the comparator  age-specific  fertility  rates to take into account  the effects  on
those rates of the inclusion  of contraceptive  users.
3'See footnote 36 above.
22Cochrane  and Sai note that the resulting  estimated  costs per birth averted  vary across  countries  as
a function  of the number  of women  who  state in surveys  that they  want no more children  -- at the
rate of $4.60 decline  for every 1 percent increase  in those who want no more children. Using
available  country  data on costs per year  of couple  protection  and on proportions  of women across
countries  who want no more children,  they estimate  three costs  per birth averted for three types  of
countries:  $259  (1987  dollars)  per birth averted in high mortality  countries  where  about 20 percent
of women  report wanting  no more  children  (typical  of Africa  and some  countries  of the Middle  East);
$213  in high  mortality  countries  where  about 30 percent of women  report wanting  no more children
(India, Bangladesh);  and $144  in low  mortality  countries  where  about 45 percent of women  report
wanting  no more children  (Colombia,  Mexico,  much of Latin America).
For the comparisons  below,  I assume  a cost  per birth averted  of $240,  since  about 80 percent
of the feasible  reductions  in population  increase  (Table  5) would  come from Africa  and the Middle
East, and another 10 percent from India and other high-fertility  countries  of Asia.
An estimate of emissions  averted for each birth averted is also needed.  For the set of
countries  where fertility  could be reduced (primarily  Africa and the Middle  East) I estimate that
annual  per capita  emissions  of carbon  are currently  0.35  tons.'  For lifetimes  of 60 ,ears, this  implies
lifetime  per capita  emissions  of 21 tons,  and with a 2 percent annual  increase  in emissions  per capita,
of 40 tons. This  per capita  figure  does not take into account  current  carbon  emissions  associated  with
deforestation  (which  in Sub-Saharan  Africa  were almost  one ton per capita in 1980', but which  on
39  0.35  tons is the weighted  average  of current  fossil  fuel-based  per capita  emissions  of Sub-Saharan
Africa,  the Middle  East/North  Africa,  South Asia and Latin  America,  where the weights  represent
the proportions  of ail expected  reduced  births (from  Table 5) and annual per capita emissions  for
these regions  are, respectively  (from  Table  2); 0.1,  0.8,  0.2 and 0.4 tons per capita.
4 United Nations  Environment  Program,  1991,  Table 1.3.
23a per capita basis  cannot continue  at the same  level);  the estimate  of 0.35  tons is thus a conservative
one.
With these assumptions,  the cost of reducing  carbon  emissions  via family  planning  programs
would  be between  $6 and $12  per ton ($240/$40  and $240/$?1)  - see Figure  1. These costs  compare
favorably  with  the marginal  cost  of $20  a ton to reduce  carbon  emissions  by 10  percent using  a carbon
tax
Is it reasonable  to assume  that $240  per birth averted  is the marginal  cost of averting  births
in a comparable  range of carbon reduction? Yes.  To achieve  an eventual reduction of current
emissions  by 10 percent, i.e., 600 million  tons, would require that between 15 and 29 million
additional  births  be averted  (600/40  tons of lifetime  per capita emissions  and 600/21  tons), at a cost
of between $3.6  billion  and $7 billion. 41 Tventy-nine  million  births  would  represent less  than one-
third  of the difference  in population  size  between  the two population  projections  discussed  above  in
the year 2000  (Table  5) and less  than 5 percent of the difference  in Africa  alone in the year 2050.
In fact, the marginal  costs of family  planning  services  to avert an additional  29 million  births may
actually  be lower  than current estimated  average  costs, and in low income countries  are Likely  to
decline  over time. It is true that marginal  costs could increase  in settings  where family  planning
services  have  already  realized  economies  of scale  (such as Indonesia  or Thailand)  and where  average
number of children is already low (China, the  United States)--though  even in  these settings,
41  Additional  spending  of such amounts  over and above  current  estimated  spending  of between  $3
and $5 billion  would be large but not unreasonable. Estimates  from various studies and sources
shown in Cochrane  et al., 1990 (Table 8) are that the annual cost in the year 2000 of services
sufficient  to ensure the fertility  decline associated  with the United Nation's medium  population
projection,  will  be between $3.6  and $8 billion  (including  private  spending)  in developing  countries.
The UN medium  projection  is similar  to the World  Bank's standard  projection. To reduce births
more, m line with the rapid fertility  decline  projection,  would  cost more.
24improvements  in contraceptive technology could drive down costs.'  However,  where family planning
services are still limited and average number of children high (Africa and the Middle East), marginal
(and average) costs are likely to decline; as the three figures for the three types of countries cited
above indicate, the cost of averting a birth appears to decline . s desired fertility declines and more
women in a population say they want no more children.'
Averting births by educating  irls. Summers (1992) notes that one additional year of female
schooling reduces fertility by between 5 and 10 percent, on the basis of econometric studies at the
country level of the effects of female education on fertility.  The effect is probably closer to 10
percent where fertility is relatively high.'  In Kenya, for example,  where the total fertility rate is 6.5,
a woman with secondary education has one fewer child than a woman with five to eight years of
education; in Colombia in 1976 a woman with one to three years of education had almost seven
births, compared to six births for a woman with four to six years of education.'  I assume below
that in the low-income countries, each additional year of girls' schooling would result in 0.3 fewer
births, a conservative assumption.
World Bank estimates of the average annual recurrent cost of one year of primary  schooling
in low income countries are about $36 per  student.  Using an assumed annual recurrent  cost of
I Reductions in the cost of abortion, including  in the industrialized countries, would have the same
effect--for example, more widespread use of RU486, an abortifacient the use of which eliminates the
need for any surgical procedure.
4'  Decline in desired family size are in turn dependent  on continuing increases in educational
attainment of women, urbanization, and so on, in these regions and continuing declines in infant
mortality. These are built in already in the population projections of the World Bank as trends that
are assumed to follow patterns set in the past.
'  de Tray (1972) reports an elasticity of fertility with respect to education of -0.3 in Pakistan,
implying  at 3 years of education a 10 percent reduction in fertility, or 0.7 fewer births given a total
fertility rate of 7.
45  For Kenya, Schafgans, 1991, cited by Summers.  For Colombia, World Bank, 1984, based on
Casterline et al., 1983.
25double that for a year of secondary school, ie.  $72, the annual cost of raising female enrollment in
all low-income countries to that in high income countries would be almost $6 billion ($560 million
for 14 million additional years of primary schooling  and $53 billion for 98 million  additional years of
secondary schooling).'6 Tbus in low-income countries, spending $6 billion on girls' schooling could
be associated with an additional 112 million years of educafion -- at the implied ratio of additional
primary to additional secondary education, an average cost of $52 per year of additional education.
This implies a cost per birth averted of $173 (at 0.3 fewer births per year of additional education).
Assuming that each birth averted is associated with a reduction in lifetime emissions of 21
tons (as discussed above), the implied marginal cost per ton of emissions averted is between $4 and
$8 (the former if we assume a 2 percent annual increase in per capita emissions) - see Figure 2.
Of course, as in the case of family  planning, these estimates do not take into account the lag
in the benefits of reduced births associated with schooling of girls. The lag would be longer than it
is for the tax or for family planning services.
Discounting. The benefits of spending on family planning and of educating girls should be
discounted to take into account the fact that costs but not benefits are immediate.  In the case of
family planning, birth reductions are immediate but benefits in terms of reduced emissions accrue
slowly  over the would-be lifetimes of those not born  In the case of educating girls, benefits begin
only when those girls reach reproductive age, and then accrue slowly  over their years of reproductive
age.
One or two examples can help illustrate the effect of discounting.' 7 In the case of family
planning, where the effect of reduced births begins immediately  but the benefits accrue gradually,
4 Summers, 1991.
471 am grateful to Bjorn Larsen and Anwar Shah for useful comments on this and the following
sections.
26consider a discount rate of 2 percent.  It would just offset the assumed 2 percent growth rate of per
capita emissions, so that the discounted tons of emissions would be 21 tons, and the cost per ton
about $12 (240/21).  With a 2 percent discount rate, and no increase in per capita emissions over
time, and assuming uniform reductions in emissions over lifetimes, the discounted carbon emissions
would be about 12 tons and the cost per ton would rise to $20 (240/12). With a 5 percent discount
rate, the cost per ton would rise to $39 (240/6.6 tons).  In the case of educating girls, an additional
assumption is required.  Assume a gap of 15 years between the additional year of education and the
year when a birth is averted (e.g. between age 10 and age 25).  Assuming not only a 2 percent
discount rate but a 2 percent annual growth in emissions, averted tons continue to be 21, and the
marginal cost per ton is $8.  Without the assumption that per capita emissions are increasing, and
taking into account the 15-year  lag, the discounted tons of emissions averted would be 9.3 tons at a
2 percent discount rate  and 3.2 tons at a 5 percent discount rate, so that marginal costs per ton are,
respectively,  $19 and $54.
The marginal cost of a carbon tax should also be discounted.  The short-run reduction in
emissions associated with a $20 tax (or a $20 marginal  cost) would be much lower than the long run
reduction, because of the difficulty  of changing the capital stock and adapting new technologies in
the short run.  Assuming  a long run period of 20 years for the tax, and a 2 percent discount rate, the
discounted tons reduced would decline by about 20 percent, implying  an increase in the marginal  cost
of a tax to about $24.  At a 5 percent discount rate, the discounted tons reduced would decline by
56 percent, implying  an increase in the marginal cost of the tax to $31.
The costs across the  different strategies of attaining a  10 percent  reduction  of carbon
emissions (from fossil fuel burning alone) under the various strategies and with different discount
rates are summarized in Table 9.
27Thus depending on  assumptions regarding expected increases in emissions in developing
countries, the appropriate discount rate, and the appropriate period of discounting, the relative costs
of the tax and the family planning strategies shift.  The greater the expected increase in per capita
emissions in developing countries (as discussed above,  increases are likely  given the current low base),
the lower the discount rate,  and the longer it takes for adjustments of the capital stock and of
technology in response to a tax, the more cost-effective the family  planning strategy is compared to
the tax.  Between family planning and educating girls, the latter is more attractive the lower the
discount rate and the steeper are expected increases over time in per capita emissions.'
An optimal carbon reduction strategy.  In fact, an optimal strategy would almost certainly
exploit some combination of a carbon tax and population reduction.  We can use the Nordhaus cost
reduction schedule to illustrate the point.  Figure 3 shows the Nordhaus marginal cost curve of a
carbon tax (MC,), and the $12 per ton cost of reducing population through family planning, (MCpp)
shown as constant until point A, and then increasing.  (The same point could be made using the
estimated cost of reducing emissions by educating girls.) As the figure indicates, at a $12 marginal
cost of reducing emissions by a tax, current emissions would decline from their baseline path by 8.35
percent.'  If this percentage reduction is sufficient, the optimal strategy is to rely solely on the $12
tax.  However, to achieve any greater decline, it makes sense to combine a $12 tax with additional
spending on family planning (or educating girls).  Combining population reduction with a tax is
I  'Ao  fully take into account the stream of costs and benefits for the tax, family planning and
education of girls would require  more than simple application of a  uniform discount rate.  For
example, note that  the benefits of averting births accumulate across generations; the costs in the
second generation of averting the births that might have occurred to persons never born in the first
generation are zero. This is true of educating girls as well as of family  planning, since there is strong
e-viden:e  that education of mothers positively affects education of children (and to a greater extent
than education of fathers), i.e., there is an echo in a second generation of the benefits of educating
girls (King and Lillard, 1987 and King and Bellew, 1989).
4' Calculation is based on Nordhaus' (1991) regression estimate, which provides the basis for his
cost curve:  In (1-R) = -.0223 - .0054 (MC).
28optimal as long as the marginal costs of the former are lower than those of the tax within the range
of the targeted reduction.  Thus in Figure 3, relying on the population reduction strategy continues
to  make sense beyond point A, up  to whatever percentage reduction is targeted, as long as its
marginal cost remains below the marginal  costs of a tax (which, of course, may not hold beyond some
point).
Discounting  the benefits of the population reduction strategies would raise the point at which
these strategies should kick in. With a relatively low targeted reduction, and a relatively high discount
rate (and depending on expected growth in per capita emissions), there may be a point at which
population reduction would not be part of a cost-effective strategy.  But given targeted reductions
in the range of 10 percent, and the range of plausible costs set out above, it appears that population
reduction in fact would be part of any cost-effective strategy.
To illustrate the point differently,  suppose a global constraint was set on the costs of reducing
carbon emissions, of $6 billion per year.  Recall that a tax of $20 per ton would imply costs to the
economy of $6 billion annually and would reduce current carbon emissions by about 10 percent or
600 mfllion  tons. How much would $6 billion reduce emissions  if spent on a combination of a tax and
population reduction?  At a rate of $12 per ton, the total cost of the tax would be about $3 billion
and emissions  would be reduced by 500 million tons.  Spending of the remaining $3 billion on family
planning would avert an  additional 12.5 million births (at $240 per  birth averted), implying an
eventual reduction of another 263 million tons of carbon emissions (at 21 tons of emissions over a
lifetime). Thus, the total effect of spending of $6 billion would be to reduce current emissions  by 763
million tons, ie., by 12.7 percent--compared to a reduction of 10 percent using the tax alone.
Conclusion
The costs of reducing carbon emissions by spending to reduce births compare favorably  with
the costs of a carbon tax; at $12 per ton, the costs of reducing births by spending on family  planning
29are equivalent  or lower than the $20 marginal  cost of a tax that would reduce emissions  by 10
percent. Discounting  at 2 percent implies  costs  of $20  a ton, in the range of our estimate  of $24  a
ton for equivalent  discounted  reductions  via a tax  The undiscounted  costs of reducing  births by
educating  girls,  at $8 per ton, are similar  to the costs  of family  planning;  discounting  at 2 percent,  and
taking  into account  the longer  lag  before the benefits  of girls'  education  begin,  costs  rise to $19  a ton.
In fact, other evidence  shows  that the marginal  effects  of both family  planning  services  and female
education  on births increase  as a function  of increases  in the other, i.e. there is a strong  interaction
between  the two.' Thus  the marginal  costs  of some  combination  of spending  on the two  population
reduction  strategies  might actually  be lower  than their costs  estimated  separately.
The implication  of the cost  analysis  for the overall  conclusion  is simple: The global  negative
externality  represented  by rapid population  growth  in developing  countries  provides  a strong, new
rationale for developed  countries,  in their own interests,  to finance programs  that would reduce
population  growth  in developing  countries.  This  is  true even  though  feasible  reductions  in population
growth would represent at best a modest contnbution to  reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
Spending  to reduce  population  growth  cannot  alone solve  the potential  problem  of global  warming.
However,  it seems  clear that some  combination  of spending  on family  planning  and girls'  education
in low  income  countries  should  be a central  part of any  optimal  carbon  reduction  strategy."
s0  Wheeler, 1985.
51 Cline (1992),  using a different approach,  similarly  concludes  that reducing  population  growth
makes sense as part of any strategy to reduce global  warming,  in terms of its relative costs and
benefits.
30Table 1. Shares in World  PEoulaton.  GDP.  and Carbon  Emissions.
Countr- Grouns. 1988
Fossil Fuel  Deforestation  Total
Pwo lation  GDP  Carbon EmissionLs  Carbon Emissions  Cabon Emissions
Developed
Countrles>  15  87  52  5  ca. 55
Eurpe  9  N/A  28  ca. 12- and USSRb'
Develop-ig  76  18  20  95  ca.  33
Cones"
Sources: World  Bank,  1990  (population  and GDP); Boden  et aL,  1990  (fossil  fuel carbon  emissions);  Houghton,  1990,  Schneider,  1991.
"2OECD
bo  Incluling  then East Germany
""Including  China
d'l99Table 2.  Fossil Fuel Carbon Emissions.
Selected Countrles and Regbons
Emissions Per
Total Emissions  Milion  Dollars of
(millions of metric  Per Capita Emissions  GDP
tons)  (metric tons)  (tons of carbon)
1960  1988  1960  1988  1989
United States  800  1,310  4.40  5.30  259
United Kingdom  161  153  3.10  2.70  185
West Germany  149  183  2.70  3.00  147
China  215  609  0.33  0.56  1,547
India  33  164  0.10  0.20  670
Bral  13  55  0.20  0.40
Latin America and
the Caribbean  278
South Korea  4  56  0.10  1.30
East Asia and the
Pacific  934
TOTAL GLOBAL  2,586  5,893  0.90  1.20
Sub-Saharan Alrica  618  0.13b  376
Middle East and  189a  0.76b  516
North Africa
Sources:  Top Panel (excluding column 5):  Boden et al. (total per capita emissions). Boden et aL do not cover
all countries, but the top 20 in terms of emissions, comprising an estimated 95% of all emissions.
Bottom panel and column 5:  World Development Report, 1992.
' 1989 data, expressed in millions of tons of carbon
b 1989 data, expressed in tons of carbon
,j71Table 3.  Cawbon  Emissions from Deforestation, bv Countrv
Annual Deforestation (1989)  Estimated Carbon Emissions  Estimated Carbon Emissions
source: Myers  source: Myers"  source: Choucri based
.square kilometers)  (millions  metric tons)  on Houghton
(millions  metric tons)
Bral  50,000  500  336
Indonesia  12,000  120  192
Colombia  6,500  65  123
Cote d'Ivoire  2,500  25  101
Nigeria  4,000  40  60
Zaire  4,000  40
TOTAL, including all
other countries  138,600  1,659
"Based  on assumption that deforestation of one square kilometer of forest emits 10,000  tons of carbon.Table 4.  Populatlon Growth Rates. Total FertiliJt  Rates,
and Ponulation ProJectLons.8>  All Developng Countries6'
Po_uladon Growth Rates
1985-2000  2025-2050  2075-2100  2125-2150
Standard  1.99  .90  .22  .05
Rapid  1.86  .64  .13  .04
Total Fertility Rates
Standard  3.62  2.241  2.063  2.054
Rapid  3.40  2.110  2.063  2.055
Ponulation Prolections (bilulons)
1985  2000  2050  2150
All Developin  Countries
Standard  3.67  4.95  8.95  10.60  11.03
Rapid  3.67  4.85  7.60  8.39  8.67
*' These numbers reflect preliminary runs (September 1991) and may change slightly before they
are published in 1992.
b> Including China, excluding Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
Source:  Preliminary World Bank projections (1991)Table 5: Percentage Reduction,
Rapid Fertilitv Decline vs. Standard.
and Shares of Total Reduction, by Rgons
percentage Reduction  Share of Total
Reduction
2000  2050  2100  2100
China  0.7  1.3  1.5  1.7  1.3
India  1.5  6.6  7.9  7.7  6.4
Sub-Sabaran Africa  4.4  34.6  43.4  51.2  53.9
Latin America  1.9  8.1  7.3  5.1  3.1
Other Asia  1.6  5.1  6.4  4.9  4.2
Mid. East & N. Africa  3.9  28.8  38.1  29.4  31.3
TOTAL  2.0  15.3  20.9  100  100Table 6.  AlternatIve  Prolecdons. Fossil Fuel
Crbon  Emission  Develogi  Countr  Regions
In:erwvemUmental  Panel  on Climate  Chang
198S  2000  2000
AbrIca  0.17  0.28  .27
Centrally
Planned Asia  0.54  0.88  .87
Lati  America  0.22  0.31  .30
Middle  Eut  0.13  0.31  .30
S& E  Asia  0.27  0.56  .55
TOTAL  1.33  2.35  230
EwronM Ml  Protection  A
1985  2000  2000  2050  2050  2100  2100
EL:  S  "s  ppa  iaF&  S=r  P"b*ox  S  BFmb
Africa  0.1  0.3  .29  0.9  .59  1.4  .79
CenOtlly
Planned Asia  0.6  1.0  .99  3.6  3.55  4.9  4.3
Latin America  0.2  0.3  .29  1.4  1.29  1.8  1.67
Milddle  East  0.1  0.2  .19  0.7  .50  1.0  .62
S. & EL  Asia  0.3  0.5  .49  2.1  1.99  4.1  3.84
TOTAL  1.3  2.3  2.25  87  7.92  13.2  11.75
Economet1rcaMv  Based"2
2000  2000  2050  2050  2100  2100
Africa (Sub.  sm  mb">  Sprr  &RMWo  SPF"  B  "31
Saharsn)  0.2  .19  3.3  216  26.3  14.89
China  1.9  1.89  15.1  14.90  93.3  91.9
Latin America  0.8  .79  7.8  7.17  50.4  46.72
Middle EaWs
N. Afiics  0.6  .58  &6  6.12  66.0  40.85
India  0.3  .30  2.6  243  17.1  15.75
Other AsIa  0.8  .79  &81  7.69  52.5  49.14
TOTALT  '  4.64  4.56  45.5  40.4  305.7  29.3
*'  SMand  P  bl,  p  aTty  =DWWr=fiWProjecton
ol'  The  figures  shown  in the RDcolumns ame  derived  by  appl4ng fth  tpeetg  decline  In population  shown  In Table  5 to the flgua  In the "stanard'  column
for fth  samear  Unfortunatel,  them  Is no a one-to.one  correpondence  betwee reional popltio  projectons  of the Worid  Ban*  and the  regiom  modelled  in
the IPCCan AM  carbon  emission  projections.  The Mmperet  declines  in population  (Tabl5)ae  appled as folownr for Alkica,  Sub,4abaran  Africa for
Lentrally Planned Adsa,  a;  for Middle East  Middle East and North Africa for South and Es  Asa,  ther Asia
d7  RcgWon  tresults avaable  frm  author.
'Columns  may not add due to roundI
YTable 7.  Effect of Slower Populatlon Growth
on Fossil Fuel Emissions. 2050
Difference In  Resulftng reduction  Percent difference  Shares In total
population size  In emissions (EPA  from baseline  reduction from
(millions)  scenario, millions  scenario  baseline scenario
of tons)
REGIONS
Africa  699  310  34  40
Centrally Planned Asia  23  50  1.4  6
latin  America  69  110  8  14
Mddle  East  401  200  8.5  26
South and East Asia  67  110  5  14
7OTAL  1,259  780  9  100
Sources:  Appendix Table and Table 6.  See notes to Table 6.Table &8  Effects of Slower Populatlon  Growth
on Reduced DeforestatIo". 2025
Other
Brazil  Indonesia  Zaire  Africa  TOTAL
Difference in population growth  8%  8%  60%
rate, in 2025
Current Annual Rate of  2.3%  1.4%  2%
Deforestation
Annual Rate of Deforestation with  2.2%  1.34%  1.4%
Slower Population Growth Rate-'
Resulting Reduction in  77,000  18,060  210,000  105,000  410,060
Deforestation (sq. kilometers)
over 35 years
Resulting Reduction in Carbon  770  181  2,100  1,050  4,100
Emissions @ 10,000 tons per sq.
kilometer (in millions  of tons)
Annualized reduction from current  22  5  60  30  117
emissions from deforestation (in
milfions  of tons)
NOTE:  Reduction by 117 million is equal to about 8 percent of current emissions due to
deforestation.
Al  Using assumption that the elasticity of deforestation rate with respect to population growth rate
is 0.5.Table  9.  Costs  of a 10%  Carbon  Reduction  (Emissions  from Fossil Fuels)
under  Various  Reduction  Strategies! 1
Carbon  Tax  Family  Planning  Educatine  Girls
No  No  No
Discount  2%01  5%!1  Discount  2%  5%  Discount  2%  5%
Mainal  Cost  20  24  31  12  20  39  8  19  54
Total  Costki  6  7.2  9  7.2  12.0  23.4  4.8  11A  32.4
($ billion)
i  Using  a baseline  in which  there are no annual  increases  in per capits emissions.  To the extent  there are such  increases,  due for example
to income  growth,  the relative  costs  of the family  planing and girls'  education  strategies  would  be lower.
Note that if the carbon  tax  and population  control  strategies  are pursued  simultaneously,  the relative  cost  of population  control  increases
because  the carbon  tax  will  make  per capita  emissions  lower  and thereby  reduce  the cost-effectiveness  of population  control  policies.  lhe
magnitude  of this effect  increases  with the size of the carbon  tax.
I  For the population  reduction  strategies,  I assume  constant  marginal  costs  in the relevant  range. For the carbon  tax,  marginal  costs  are
increasing.
K Assuming  a long  run period  of 20 years  for the full effects  of the tax to take hold.Figure 1
Family Planning to Reduce Carbon Emissions
Estimated cost per birth averted:  $240
Estimated annual expected per capita emissions (of births averted2):  0.35 tons
Times 60 years (lifetime)  21 tons
With 2% annual increase  40 tons
Cost per ton of emissions:  Between $6 (240/40) and $12 (240121)
Figure 2
Educatine Girls to Reduce Carbon Emissions
Estimated cost for an additional year of girls' schooling  $52
Assumed reduction in births for each year of schooling  0.3
Cost per birth averted  $173
0.35 tons times 60 years (lifetime)  21 tons
With 2% annual increase  40 tons
Cost per ton of resulting reduced emissions  Between $4 (173/40) and $8 (17321)
' Le. weighted average of current emissions per  capita by region, where weights correspond to
proportions of all expected reduced births.FIGURE 3
MARGINAL  COSTS  OF C02  REDUCTION: CARBON
TAX AND  SPENDING  ON FAMILY PLANNING
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PERCENTAGE REDUCTION  OF  C02Appendi  Tabb:  Population Projections for Selected Countries. Regions and Years
1985  2000  Difference  2050  Difference  2100  Difference  2150  Differenoe China
Standard  1,048  1,294  1,764  1,854  28  1,886
Rapid  1,285  1,741  1,826  1,857
India
Standard  765  1,007  1,600  1,791  1,856




Standard  455  724  2,020  2,751  2,923
Rapid  692  1,321  1,557  1,646
Latin
America
Standard  400  526  849  930  950
Rapid  516  780  862  880
Other  Asia
Standard  624  820  13  1,308  67  1,447  1,493




Standard  372  570  22  1,390  401  1,817  693  1,901  736
Rapid  548  989  ____1,124 
___  1,165  ___ TOTAL  3,664  101  1,364  2,217  2,356
Note:  Difference is standard minus rapid.Bibliogrglkyr
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